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ABSTRACT
Evidencebased on the past three decades of U.S. experience
shows that the difference between the interest rates on
commercial paper and Treasury bills has consistently borne a
systematic relationship to subsequent fluctuations of
nonfinancial economic activity. This interest rate spread
typically widens in advance of recessions, and narrows again
before recoveries. The relationship remains valid even after
allowance for other financial variables that previous researchers
have often advanced as potential business cycle predictors.
This paper provides support for each of three different
explanations for this predictive power of the paper—bill spread.
First, changing perceptions of default risk exert a clearly
recognizable influence on the spread. This influence is all the
morediscernableafter allowance for effects associated with the
changing volume of paper issuance when investors view commercial
paper and Treasury bills as imperfect portfolio substitutes --a
key assumption for which the evidence introduced here provides
support. Second, again under conditions of imperfect
substitutability, a widening paper-bill spread is also a symptom
of the contraction in bank lending due to tighter monetary
policy. Third, there is also evidence of a further role for
independent changes in the behavior of borrowers in the
commercial paper market due to their changing cash requirements
over the course of the business cycle.
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W1IX QQ I1 PAPER-BILLSPREADPREDICT KEECONOMICACTIVITY?
Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner*
People have always sought reliable ways to predict the future, and economic
fluctuations are no exception. Public policymakers, charged with the
responsibility to maintain full but not over-full employment of the economy's
productive resources, want to know when to take actions that will either
stimulate or retard economic activity. Business executives who plan to build
new factories or modernize old ones, or who consider the introduction of new
products, want to know when the markets for what their companies make will be
strong. Both individual and institutional investors, allocating their
portfolios across major asset categories like equities and fixed-income
securities, and in some cases picking specific corporations' stocks, want to
know whether recession or economic expansion will prevail over the relevant
investment horizon.
A series of recent papers --Stockand Watson (1989a), Friedman and Kuttner
(1989), Bernanke (1990), Kashyap et.al (1991) --hasshown that, for the past
three decades or so, the difference between the respective interest rates on
commercial paper and Treasury bills has borne a systematic relationship to
subsequent fluctuations of nonfinancial economic activity in the United States.
As such relationships go. this one has been fairly robust. The paper-bill
spread easily outperforms any single interest rate, either nominal or real, as-2-
well as any of the monetary aggregates,
as a predictor of real economic
activity. The spread bears a statistically
significant relationship not just to
future movements of aggregate
output and spending, but to almost all of the
familiar components of real activity
as well. Finally, in contrast to the
monetary aggregates (the subject of an earlier literature
along these lines,
which ended in spectacular disappointment),
there is no ambiguity about whether
the paper-bill spread is related to thereal or price side of nominal income
fluctuations. (On the latest evidence,money is related to neither.) The
spread is a predictor of real economic
activity, not prices, and of nominal
magnitudes only to the extent that they reflectreal ones.
Why is all this so? And is there
any ground for confidence that the
relationships that have connected the paper-bill
spread to subsequent business
fluctuations in the past will continueto prevail for at least some time into
the future? These questions motivate
the analysis presented in thispaper.
Section I briefly reviews andexpands the evidence from previous work
documenting the relationships between thepaper-bill spread and real economic
activity in the United States. Section II detailssome of the practical
differences between commercial
paper and Treasury bills that plausibly accounr
for the spread between therespective interest rates on these two instruments.
An important product of thispart of the analysis is a decomposition of the
observed spread into a component that
covaries directly with the general level
of interest rates; a
component directly representing the variationover time in
the perceived risk of default
on commercial paper; and a componentcapturing
other influences that
vary over time in a way that may or may not be relatedto
the business cycle. Section IIIuses a simple model of the behavior of
borrowers and len4ers in the short-term
credit markets to develop three distinct
(albeit not mutually exclusive)hypotheses to account for the relationship-3-
between the paper-bill spread and fluctuations in business activity. Section IV
applies a variety of statistical tests to provide evidence bearing on the
validity of any or all of these three hypotheses. Section V brings together the
principal conclusions developed throughout the paper.
To anticipate, the evidence presented in this paper suggests, at the least,
a two-fold explanation for the predictive power of the paper-bill spread with
respect to real economic activity, based on both default risk and monetary
policy. First, changing perceptions of default risk, as business prospects
alternatively strengthen and ebb, exert a clearly recognizeable influence on the
spread and also account for part of the spread's relationship to subsequent
movements of real output. Second, in a world in which investors view commercial
paper as an imperfect substitute for Treasury bills -- akey assumption, for
which the relationships estimated in Section IV provide some supporting evidence
-- awidening paper-bill spread is also a symptom of the contraction in bank
lending due to tighter monetary policy. Finally, independent changes in the
behavior of borrowers in the commercial paper market, due to their changing cash
requirements over the course of the business cycle, also influence the
paper-bill spread in ways that connect it to subsequent economic fluctuations.-4-
I. Th Basic Relationshin
The upper panel of Figure 1 shows monthly-average values of therespective
interest rates on 6-month prime-rated commercial paper and 180-day U.S.Treasury
bills, for 1959.90.1Both series display the basic features characteristic of
practically all U.S. interest rates during this period: a generally rising
overall trend from the 1950s until the early 1980s, increasing volatility
beginning in the early l970s, a downward trend and reduced volatility in the mid
to late l980s, and the familiar cyclicality throughout.(The shaded areas in
the figure represent recessions as designed by the National Bureau of Economics
Research.) The commercial paper rate has, almost always, exceeded the Treasury
bill rate.2 While the covariation of the two series is hardly perfect, the
dominant visual impression offered by these data is that the two interestrates
tend to move roughly together over time.
The covariation of the two rates is not perfect, however, and the focus of
this paper is on the movement over time of the difference between them. The
lower panel of Figure 1 (with magnified scale compared to that of theupper
panel) plots the monthly-average difference between the 6-month commercialpaper
rate and the 180-day Treasury bill rate for the same period. Over the entire
32-year sample, the mean spread was .51% per annum (that is, 57 basis points).
with standard deviation .49%. In contrast to theupper panel, here there is
little evidence of persistent time trends. But like the two interestrates
themselves, the spread between them does display a distinct cyclicality. As
Table 1 shows, the spread is typically wider not justduring but also
immediately prior to recessions (although the 1990 experience --inwhich the
spread widened much longer in advance of the recession, only then to narrow
again before the recession began --isan obvious counter-example).
Table 2, updated from Friedman and Kuttner (1989), shows that thewidening18.0
16.0
14.0
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
Figure 1
Six-Month Commercial Paper & Treasury Bill Rates
59 62 65 68 71 74 17 80 83 86 89
59 62 65 68 71 74 77 80 83 86 89
Six-Month Paper - Bill SpreadTable I
Cyclical Behavior of the Paper—Bill Spread
Spread (%) Observations
Mean over entire 59:1—90:12 sample 0.57 384
Mean dunngrecessions 1.10 66
Mean excluding recessions 0.46 318
Mean 1—6 months pnortorecessions 0.88 36
Mean 7—12 monthspriorto recessions 0.50 36
Notes: Observations are monthly averages of daily data.
Underlying interest rates are for six-month commercial paper and six-month Treasury bills.
Source: Boani of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.Table 2
F-Statisticsfor Financial Vanables in QuarterlyRealOutput Equations
Three-variable system (real output,priceIndex, financial variable)
60:2—90:4 60:2—79:3 70:3—90:4
rrra 770" 8.12" 5.32"
Mn(Ml) 2.65" 2.59" 1.77
1n(M2) 4*** 378" 2.19'
in(Cidit) 1.21 1.97 0.34
.Tp 5.80" 1.95 4.14"
& 4.76" 2.21' 3.62"
r10—r 734*** 444*** 6.70"
Four-variable system (also including mid-expansion government expenditures)
60:2—90:4 60:2—79:3 70:3—90:4
rp—r3 7.16" 7.10" 468"
1n(Ml) 2.85" 2.71" 1.81
Jn(M2) 4.32" 3.63" 1.81
Jn(Credit) 1.02 2.34' 0.16
& 5.61" 1.55 394*"
iB 4.52*** 1.81 344"
r10—r 7.23" 3.82" 6.41"
* Significant*110% level " Significantat 5% level " Significantat 1% level
Notes: Regressions include four lags of each included variable.
Real output variable is gross national product in 1982 dollars.
Price indexisthe implicit GNP deflator.-5-
of the paper-bill spread in anticipation of downturns in real economic activity
represents information beyond that already contained in the aerial correlation
of real activity itself, or in fluctuations of either price inflation or federal
government expenditures. The table also shows that other familiar financial
variables, like interest rates or growth of the monetary aggregates, either do
not contain such incremental information at all or do so to a lesser extent.
The upper panel of the table presents F-statistics for the null hypothesis that
all coefficients are zero in regressions of the form
—a+ + E + E + u (1)
where X and P are the natural logarithms of real gross national product and the
corresponding price deflator, respectively; Z is, first, the difference between
the 6-month prime commercial paper rate and the 180-day Treasury bill rate and
then, in sequence, a series of other familiar financial variables as indicated
in the table; u is a disturbance term; and a, and are all coefficients
to be estimated. The lower panel presents analogous F-statistics based on
equations that are identical to (1) except that they also include, as an
additional set of regressors, a distributed lag on the (log) change in
"mid-expansion" federal expenditures. The table presents results separately for
the full 1960:II-1990:lv sample and for two sub-samples: 1960:11-1979:111 (that
is, until the Federal Reserve System's adoption of new monetary policy
procedures in October 1979) and l97O:III-l99O:IV (that is, since the elimination
of Regulation Q interest ceilings on large certificates of deposit in June
1970)
Among the se'en financial variables considered, the paper-bill spread is-6-
one of only two -- theother being the long-short spread -- thatcontain
incremental information about subsequent movements of real output that is
significant at the .01 level in the full 1960-90 sample and in both sub-samples
separately, and regardless of whether the fiscal variable is included or not.
Indeed, none of the other five financial variables considered meets this
criterion even at the .10 significance level.
Table 3 presents an analogous set of results based on monthly data. Here
industrial production takes the place of real gross national product, the
producer price index takes the place of the CNP deflator, each distributed lag
is of length 6, and the results shown correspond only to the upper panel of
Table 2 --thatis, without the fiscal variable.4 Here the paper-bill spread is
alone among the seven variables tested in containing incremental information
about subsequent movements of industrial production that is significant at the
.01 level in the full 1960-90 sample as well as in both sub-samples separately.
The growth rate of the M2 money stock, the change in the commercial paper rate
and the long-short spread satisfy this criterion at the .05 level. None of the
other financial variables does so even at the .10 level.
Table 4 presents results for an alternative form of test, suggested by
Stock and Watson (l989b), again based on monthly data. The Stock-Watson
regression includes 12 lags each of the respective log changes in industrial
production and the producer price index, 12 lags of the change in the commercial
paper rate (so that the list of variables corresponding to Z now excludes the
paper rate change and the bill rate change). 6 lags on the designated financial
variable, and a linear time trend. Here the paper-bill spread is again the only
financial variable tested that contains incremental information about subsequent
movements in industrial production that is significant at the .01 level
regardless of sample. None of the others -- includingthe long-short spread .-Table 3
F-StatisUcsfor Financial Variables in Monthly Real Output Equations
Three-variablesystem(realoutput, priceindex, financial variable)
60:2—90:12 60:2—79:9 70:7—90:12
rp—r8 8.47*** 6.33*** 6.l0'"
Mn(M1) 2.27** 2.23 0.95
Jn(M2) 47Ø* 3.69*** 2.l2**
Mn(Cidit) 1.45 1.44 1.46
&, 2.89*** 34Q*** 2.09*
B 2.03* 1.17 1.61
r10—r 399*** 473*** 2.49**
* Significantat 10% level
** Significantat 5% level
Significant at 1% level
Notes: Regressions include six lags of each included variable.
Real oulput variable is industrial production.
Price index is the producer price index.Table 4
F-StatisticsforFinancial Variables in Monthly Real Output Equations(Stock-WatsonSpecification)
Four-variable jys:em (real output,price index,commercialpaper rate, financial variable)
60:2—90:12 60:2—79:9 70:7—90:12
rp—ra 6.04*** 2.85 4.24***
1n(M1) 0.83 0.77 0.59
ln(M2) 3.08*** 2.25** 1.47
ln(Credit) 1.10 0.93 1.29
r10—r 2.11* 1.16 1.62
* Significantat 10%level
** Significantat 5%level
***Significant at 1% level
Notes: Regressions include six lags of the financialvariable,twelve lags on each of the other three
variables, and a linear time trend.
See Table 3 forvariabledefinitions.-7-
does so even at the .10 level.
Finally, Table 5 presents both F-statistics and variance decompositions
based on a series of vector autoregression systems including, in each case, the
respective log changes in real output and the corresponding price deflator, the
paper-bill spread and, one at a time in succession, each of the other financial
variables considered in Tables 2 and 3 above. The estimation is based on
quarterly data, with variables and lag specification corresponding to that
underlying the upper panel of Table 2. For each system, the table presents the
F-statistics for the distributed lags on the paper-bill spread and the other
financial variable in the equation for real output, and then the respective
share of the variance of real output accounted for by the paper-bill spread and
by the other financial variable (together with the corresponding 95% confidence
intervals), measured at both four- and eight-quarter horizons. For purposes of
these variance decompositions, the real output variable is ordered first, the
price variable second, the other financial variable third, and the spread last.
When the measure of output used is real gross national product (the upper
panel), the F-statistics presented in Table S indicate that the paper-bill
spread contains incremental information about subsequent movements in real
output that is significant at the .01 level in the presence of any of the
additional financial variables except HZ and the long-short spread, in which
case the relevant information is significant at the .05 level and the .10 level,
respectively.Among the other financial variables considered, only the
long-short spread and the bill rate change are significant here at the .10 level
or better in the presence of the paper-bill spread.
When the output measure is real domestic absorption (the middle panel),
however, the paper-bill spread contains information that is significant at the
.01 level in the presence of y of the other financial variables. Among theTable S
Performance of Alternative Financial IndicatorsinQuarterlyReal OutputVARs
Output• real gross nationalproduct
ln(M1) rp.-r3 bln(M2) tp.-t Mn(Credit) 1r1.
F-Statistic
%ofvaziance@4Q
€8Q
1.59 619"
9±9 18±12
11*9 18±12
0.76 3.33"
12±10 9±9
15±11 10±8
0.92 7.11'"
4±5 22±12
5±5 22±12
rrr r1—r r—r
F-Statistic
%ofvariancc@4Q
@SQ
2.19' 4.81"
12±10 14±10
16±11 14±10
1.89 3.51"
16±11 9±8
18±12 10±8
2.09' 2.39'
15±11 7±7
17±11 13±11
Output =real domesticabsorbzion
.1n(M1) r1,—r11 AIn(M2) rp—rB Mn(Credii)rrra
F-Statistic
%ofvariance@4Q
Q8Q
1.44 8.57"
10±10 19±12
12*10 20±12
1.81 5.26**
15*11 10±9
17*12 13±9
L34 10.30"
3±5 27±14
4±5 27±14
rp—r Ar rP—rB r10—r
F-Statistic
%ofvariance@4Q
@8Q
3.45" 6.79"
16±11 15±11
22±13 17±11
2.88" 4.06"
22±12 8±8
23±12 14±10
1.48 3.96'"
18±12 8±8
19±12 18±12Output = teal businessfixedinvestment
iMn(M1) r—r .1n(M2) rrra ln(Credit) rp—r5
F-Statistic
%ofvariance@4Q
@8Q
0.32 4.07"
7±9 17±12
8±9 20±14
0.68 2.14
14±12 9±10
17±14 10±10
0.17 4.66'"
2±4 21±14
3±4 24±16
rp—r8 r-r r10—r rp—r5
F-Statistic
%ofvariance@4Q
@8Q
2.26' 4.71*
4±5 20±14
12±11 19±14
1.60 4.32"
8±9 17±13
15±14 16±12
0.89 3.54*"
6±8 13±12
14±12 14±11
* Significantat 10% level
** Significantat 5% level "Significantat 1% level
Notes: Sample in each case is 1960:2—1990:4.
Equations include four lags of each variable.
The mean vanance decomposition and its confidence interval were computed via Monte-Carlo
with 1000 draws.
Table S
(continued)-8-
others, here only the paper rate change and the bill rate change (separately)
contain significant incremental information in the presence of the paper-bill
spread. Similarly, when the output measure is real investment in plant and
equipment, the paper-bill spread again contains information that is significant
at the .01 level in the presence of ny of the other financial variables. Here
the bill rate change is the only other variable to contain significant
incremental information in the presence of the paper-bill spread.5
The variance decomposition results presented in Table 5 largely support
these findings from significance tests based on the output equation alone. In
most of the vector autoregression systems estimated, the paper-bill spread
accounts for a percentage of the variance of the relevant real output measure,
either four or eight quarters ahead, that is both economically important
(typically between 10% and 20%) and statistically significant (at the .05
level). Further, in most cases the paper-bill spread dominates whatever is the
other financial variable in the system despite the orderirit of .thf paper-bill
spread the underlyins orthotonaliration. Table 6 highlights the
relevance of this ordering by presenting alternative variance decomposition
results for those three financial variables which, for at least some output
measures, account for a greater share of output in the decompositions shown in
Table 5. In these alternative results, in which the paper-bill spread is
ordered third and the other financial variable fourth, the dominance of the
paper-bill spread is pervasive.
In sum,bothsingle-equation significance tests and multiple-equation
variance decompositions based on the last three decades of U.S. experience
consistently point to a statistically significant relationship between movements
of the paper-bill .spread and subsequent fluctuations in real economic activity,
even in the presence of other financial variables that previous researchers haveTable 6
Perfoimance of Alternative FinancialIndicators in QuarterlyReal OutputVARs
OrthogonalizanonOrder Reversed
Output= real gross nationalproduct
r,—r Aln(M2) r1,—r r10—r rp—rB Ar
F-Statistic
%ofvariance@4Q
@8Q
333***0.76
17±124±5
16±118±8
2.39* 2.09* 13.51*** 1.89
16±11 6±7 18±127±7
15±1015±1117±1112±9
Output = real domestic absorbnon
rp—r8 .1ri(M2) rp—r8 r10_-r
F-Statistic
%ofvanance@4Q
@8Q
5.26*** 1.81
21±135±6
20±1211±10
3.96***148 406*** 2.88**
21±134±7 21±1210±8
21±1217±1321±1117±11
Output = real business fixed investment
r1,—r Aln(M2) r1,—r8 r10—r rp—r
F-Statistic
%ofvarianc@4Q
@SQ
2.14* 0.68
18±145±7
19±148±9
354*** 0.89 4.32*** 1.60
17±143±4 21±143±4
16±1312±1223±147±7
Notes: Secnotes to Table 5.-9-
researchers have often advanced as potential business cycle predictors.-10.
II. Accountine for the Soread
Commercial paper represents the unsecured, discounted short-term (up to 270
days) liability of either nonfinancial business corporations or financial
intermediaries. As of yearend 1989, the volume of such claims outstanding it
theUnited States totaled $579 billion, of which approximately 18% was the
liability of U.S. nonfinancial businesses, 8% of U.S. bank holding companies,
52% of U.S. nonbank financial intermediaries, and 11% of foreign obligors.
Roughly one-third of the $579 billion had been originally issued directly by the
obligors (in practically all cases financial institutions) and the remaining
two-thirds through commercial paper dealers acting in the obligors' behalf.
Although commercial paper in some form or other has existed in the United States
for over a century, the commercial paper market in its current form is largely a
post World War II phenomenon, and the market's growth in recent decades has been
rapid. As recently as 1960, for example, the total volume outstanding was just
$6.5 billion (13% issued by U.S. nonfinancial businesses, 57% by U.S. nonbank
financial intermediaries, and 18% by foreign obligors).6
Treasury bills represent the short-term (up to one year) discount
obligations of the U.S. Treasury, backed by the full faith and credit of the
United States Government. The Treasury first issued discounted instruments
resembling today's Treasury bills in 1929. Since then the volume outstanding
has fluctuated with the level of the government's debt and also with the varying
maturity patterns used to finance that debt. Given the enormous volume of debt
of all maturities used to finance the U.S. military effort in World War II, the
Treasury bill market has been large and well developed throughout the post-war
period: The volume of Treasury bills outstanding in 1946 was $17 billion. At
yearend 1990 it was $482 billion.
Three factors appear most important in accounting for l'ne typically greater-11-
observed interest rate on commercial paper than on Treasury bills. First,
federal statute precludes states or municipalities from taxing income earned as
interest on any U.S. Treasury obligations, bills included, except for those
states that employ the franchise tax on business income or impose an excise tax
on bank income. By contrast, interest earned on privately issued obligations.
like coercial paper, is typically taxable at the state or municipal level. As
of 1990, 43 states (plus the District of Columbia) had individual income taxes,
with rates applicable to interest income varying up to a high of 14% in
Connecticut. Similarly, 28 states (plus the District of Columbia) had corporate
income taxes.7 In addition, some municipalities have income taxes applicable to
interest income. In 1990 New York City taxed income earned by residents at a
maximum rate of 395%8
To the extent that an investor choosing between commercial paper and
Treasury bills is a taxable entity domiciled in a state and/or municipality with
an income tax, therefore, some positive interest rate spread between paper and
bills is necessary to render the two instruments' respective returns identical
on an after-tax basis •-thatis, to achieve
(1-v) r —r
(2)
where r and rE are the nominal interest rates paid on commercial paper and
Treasury bills, respectively, and c is the effective state/municipal tax rate.
Moreover, the required spread for this purpose varies directly with the level of
the tax-exempt rate, according to
-r
—(f—) rB-12-
Given values of 0.57% for the spread and 6.48% for the bill rate, onaverage for
the 1959-90 sapple period spanned in Figure 1, the implied effective tax rate
would be 8.1% (that is, .081) If differential taxability were the sole factor
accounting for a nonzero average spread over time.(A 9.7% tax rate would be
required to explain in full the average spread between commercial paper and
Treasury bills at three months maturity.)
A second factor clearly differentiating Treasury bills from commercial
paper is that payment on the paper is subject to potential default by private
obligors. Moreover, in the event of bankruptcy, the unsecured status of
commercial paper typically places it low on the scale in the application of the
conventional "me-first" rules. Given any nonzero probability of default, even a
risk-neutral investor would require a positive paper-bill spread to want to hold
commercial paper instead of Treasury bills. The expected after-tax returns on
the two assets are identical when
(1 -w#)(l-r)r - — r5 (4)
where r is now the uromised interest rate on the commercial paper; w is the
probability that a default on the paper will occur within the time horizon that
is relevant for this investment; is the fraction, 0 s S1,of the stated
principal amount that the investor will lose in the event of default; and r is
again the state/municipal tax rate.
If investors are risk-averse, however, mere equality of expected returns is
insufficient to make an investor willing to hold a risky rather than a risk-free
asset, and so the required spread is correspondingly greater. To take a simple
example, suppose that an investor's portfolio consists entirely of Treasury
bills and commercial paper, and that the investor's choice between them is-13-
governed by maximization of expected utility of nominal end-of-period wealth,
where the "period" is identical to the stated maturity of the bills and the
paper (so that the bills are genuinely riskiess), and utility is characterized
by constant relative risk aversion. Then the relationship between the two
(promised) interest rates that leaves the investor just indifferent between the
twoassetsat the margin is
[1 -- 2apw(1-i)2)(l-i')r-ops(l-s)#2(l-r)2r
-i[l
-a(l-w)]—r
(5)
where a is the fraction of the investor's portfolio invested in commercial paper
and p is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In contrast to the experience of the inter-war period, which included 171
separate default episodes, few issuers have defaulted on their outstanding
conercia1 paper since World War •9 By far the most significant post-war
default was Penn Central's failure to meet payment on $82 million of paper due
in June 1970. Following the Penn Central default, the major credit rating
agencies introduced new systems of rating commercial paper, not only
distinguishing prime-rated from non-prime paper but also designating three
separate categories of prime-rated paper (P-i, P-2 and P-3 by Moody's; A-i, A-2
and A-3 by Standard and Poor's). Since the introduction of these ratings, only
five rated issuers have experienced defaults, and three of these had lost their
prime ratings before their respective defaultsoccurred.1°
Some authors have pointed to the Scant experience of actual defaults to
argue that default risk must play a small if not negligible role in accounting
for the observed positive spread between the promised interest rate on
commercial paper and the Treasury bill rate.11 To be sure, this argument is-14-
plausible if the question at hand is whether default risk alone can explain the
spread. Like the two instruments' differing tax status, however, the relevant
issue is the potential role played by default risk in conjunction with other
factors.
Gauging the relevant default rate w and loss rate to employ in an
expression like (5) is problematic for several reasons. One is just the
distinction between event frequencies observed within any (finite) sample and
the corresponding subjective probabilities as assessed by rational agents -.in
other words, the familiar "Peso problem."12 A second is that there is no
guarantee that the relevant agents whose subjective probabilities have mattered
for the relative pricing of commercial paper and Treasury bills were in fact
"rational" in the usual technical sense. Yet a third is that many of these
agents -- thoseacting in a fiduciary capacity, for example -- mayhave been
responding to incentives not encompassed within the usual risk-return utility
calculus. (The embarrassment in the event of a client's holding defaulted paper
may matter, in addition to the pecuniary loss to the client's accounts.)
Finally, many investors in commercial paper either cannot or do not diversify
their holdings sufficiently to render their own potential loss rates equivalent
to those of the commercial paper universe outstanding. Such investors therefore
plausibly perceive a potential default as a more catastrophic event than what
the aggregate data suggest.
Figure 2 plots combinations of default probability w (for values up to a
maximum of .1) and state tax rate r (for values up to .09) that satisfy the
relationship in (5) for the average values of r and r5 observed over 1959-90,
given loss rate—.0064,portfolio proportion a —37(the most recent actual
paper/(paper +bill)ratio as measured in the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds
accounts), and two separate values of the coefficient of relative risk aversionI
FIgure 2
Tax Rates and Default Probabes Consistent with the Mean Spread
Probability ol detau
Average annualized paper yield 7.05%
Average annualized bill yield 6.49%
Assumed loss rate 0.64%-15-
p: 0 (that is, risk neutrality) and 20. A loss rate of .0064 corresponds to the
worst recorded experience for the commercial paper market in any given year
since World Var 1, when 0.64% of the outstanding paper was lost in defaults in
1931. Parameter e therefore represents the probability that investors associate
with a given year's replicating the 1931 default experience.
As the discussion of equations (2) and (3) above indicates, a state tax
rate of .081 would be sufficient to account fully for the observed mean
paper-bill spread in the absence of any possibility at all of default. A
non-zero probability of default makes the observed mean spread consistent with a
lower tax rate. For example, if investors believe there is a one-in-twenty
chance of default on 0.64% of their commercial paper holdings (that is, w —
.05),this default probability together with a state tax rate of approximately
.06 would be sufficient to account for the entire observed mean spread. As the
figure makes clear, these results are not very sensitive to the assumed risk
aversion.
Finally, a third factor potentially also underlying the positive average
paper-bill spread is the greater liquidity of Treasury bills compared to
commercial paper)3 The market for U.S. Treasury bills has traditionally been
the most liquid of any asset market in the United States (in recent decades, in
the entire world) in terms of an investor's ability to buy or sell large amounts
of securities with minimum transactions costs, minimum impact of the investor's
own action on the market price, maximum availability of agents willing to act in
the investor's behalf, and maximum availability of either financing for margined
long pQsittons or securities to borrow against short positions. Despite
substantial advances in the last decade or two, the commercial paper market has
never met this standard. Firms issuing commercial paper, or dealers acting in
their behalf, are usually willing to take back paper presented by investors-16-
before the stated maturity date, but they bear no legal obligation to do so.
Finding third-party buyers is also problematic.
Various legal restrictions also contribute to making Treasury bills a more
liquid ssset than commercial paper for the specific categories of investors to
which they apply. Commercial banks and other depository institutions, for
example, can use Treasury bills as collateral when they borrow from the Federal
Reserve discount window. Commercial paper is not eligible collateral for this
purpose. Similarly, under current federal tax law, state governments
undertaking advance refunding of outstanding obligations must invest the
proceeds in Treasury securities to avoid sacrificing the exemption of the
interest that they pay from taxability at the federal level. Here too,
commercial paper does not qualify.
Differential liquidity therefore presumably accounts for at least some part
of the positive paper-bill spread on average over time. In analytical terms, a
liquidity value of bills over paper would simply take the form of a constant
subtracted from the left-hand-side of (5), which in turn would shift both of the
curves in Figure 2. In addition, differential liquidity could also account for
either cyclical variation of the paper-bill spread (for example, if investors
value liquidity more highly when a recession increases the uncertainty
surrounding their own cash flows) or a time trend in the spread (presumably
negative, to reflect the gradually increasing efficiency of the commercial paper
market during the past few decades).
In the end, what is most interesting about the paper-bill spread is neither
the mean spread over time nor the presence or absence of a time trend, but the
way in which variation of the spread through time corresponds, with some lead
period, to fluctuations in real economic activity. There is little reason to
think that state or municipal income tax rates vary systematically with the-17-
business cycle. By contrast, there is some ground to suspect that the value
investors place on the greater liquidity of bills over paper does so. Further,
as Figure 3 shows, both the frequency of business failures and the volume of
defaulted business liabilities (scaled by gross national product) vary inversely
with the pace of real economic activity)4 As a result, it is also plausible to
suppose that rational investors increase their subjective assessment of default
rate w (and perhaps also reduce their assessment of recovery rate )ifthey
have independent information indicating that a business recession is imminent.
Andifthey do, then arbitrage behavior like that underlying the relationship in
(5) would, in turn, deliver time variation in the paper-bill spread that would
anticipate business fluctuations.
In addition, given that such features as the favorable tax treatment of
bills, the default risk on paper and the superior liqudity of bills render these
twoinstrumentsimperfect portfolio substitutes, fluctuations in their relative
market supplies will also lead to fluctuations in the spread along the lines
illustrated in (5). As the discussion in Section III below explains, some of
these supply movements, and hence some of the resulting fluctuations in the
spread, are plausibly related to the business cycle. Others, however, may
merely reflect institutional technicalities of the Treasury bill market.
Short-term fluctuations in the Treasury's cash flow alternatively swell the
supply of bills or increase the demand (by forcing banks to present eligible
collateral against enlarged tax and loan account balances). These fluctuations
occur in part on a seasonal basis, but also in part irregularly. Fluctuations
in the volume of advance debt refundings by state and local governments, as
sometimes occur in anticipation of changes in tax legislation, also affect the
demand for Treasury bills (because of legal restrictions on these borrowers'
options for temporarily re-investing the proceeds of advance refundings). So doFiQure 3
Bankniptcy and befault Rates, 1953-90
Source: Disi fl Bmdslreet Coverage does not fldude all lrudusvy sectors.
Falkas per 10000 concerns
(d wale)
0.2
Uabdities of falS concernsas a percentage of GNP
(right scale)
•0.1-18-
fluctuations in the Federal Reserve's open market operations (because most open
market purchases and sales take place in Treasury securities). So do most
exchange market interventions by foreign central banks (because most central
banks, though nowadays not all, hold a disproportionately large share of their
dollar portfolios in Treasury bills compared to the portfolio of the typical
private market participant). So do the "window dressing" activities of banks
and other private investors that choose to sacrifice a few days' interest
differential in order to show atypically large Treasury bill holdings on their
year- or even quarter-end financial statements. The effect of each of these
institutional distortions is presumably to introduce "noise" in the paper-bill
spread, in the sense of movement unlikely to correspond to what matters in
financial markets for nonfinancial economic activity.
Table 7 presents estimation results for a series of regressions intended to
capture some of the main elements in the discussion above of the determinants of
the paper-bill spread. The coefficient values in the first row of the table,
based on monthly data spanning 1974:1-1990:12, show that the paper-bill spread
is positively (and strongly) related to the level of the bill rate, as the tax
argument and the default-risk argument presented above both suggest.15 The
results in the second row show that the spread is also positively (and strongly)
related to the perceived commercial paper default risk, measured here by the
spread between the respective interest rates on P2- and P1-rated paper. The
results in the third row show that both findings hold up, to at least a
marginally significant degree, when the regression includes the two variables
together. Finally, the results in the fourth row show that, even in the
presence of these two variables, there is again no statistically significant
evidence of a time trend in the spread.(A negative time trend, for example,
might represent a declining liquidity value of bills over paper as theTable 7
Decompositions of the Paper—Bin Spread
Usingthe convnercialpaper quality dfferenrial (sample1974:1—1990:12)
Constant
Interest rate
level
Quality
differential Trend R2 SE DW
1 0.12
(0.23)
0.09
(0.02)
0.160.500.30
2 0.25
(0.15)
0.70
(0.20)
0.220.480.33
3 —0.11
(0.27)
0.05
(0.03)
0.54
(0.27)
0.300.470.32
4 -.0.76
(0.83)
0.05
(0.02)
0.68
(0.15)
—0.0015
(0.0018)
0.280.460.33
Using the corporate bond quality djfferen:ial (sample1959:1—1990:12)
Constant
Interest rate
level
Quality
differential Trend R2 SE DW
1 0.12
(0.09)
0.07
(0.02)
0.16 0.44 0.31
2 0.43
(0.13)
0.13
(0.11)
0.01 0.48 0.28
3 0.19
(0.09)
0.09
(0.03)
—0.20
(0.13)
0.18 0.44 0.33
4 0.31
(0.15)
0.11
(0.03)
—0.15
(0.12)
—0.0008
(0.0007)
0.19 0.43 0.34
Note: Numbers in parentheses are mbuse standard errors, corrected for 12th order moving-average
serial correlation.- 19-
commercial paper market has developed over time.)
The lower panel of of Table 7 shows the results of an attempt to replicate,
for the longer sample spanning 1959:1-1990:12, the four regressions shown just
above. Because published commercial paper ratings were not introduced until
after the Penn Central default, however -- hencethe 1974 starting date of the
sample used for the regressions in the upper panel -- herethe spread between
the respective interest rates on Baa- and Ma-rated corporate bonds is used as a
proxy for perceived commercial paper default risk. Risk of default over the
coming six months need not be the same as risk of default over the life of a 20-
or 30. year bond, however, and so the default-risk aspect of the attempt to
extend these results backward to the longer sample does not deliver significant
results.16 (Indeed, in equations combining the bill rate level and the bond
quality spread, the point estimates for the spread variable's coefficient are,
nonsensically, negative). By contrast, the strongly positive relationship
between the paper-bill spread and the level of the bill rate corresponds well to
the result found in the shorter sample. So does the absence of any evidence of
a time trend.
Figure 4, based on the regression in the third row of the upper panel of
Table 7, shows a decomposition of the monthly variation of the paper-bill spread
during 1974-90 into three components: a part attributed to variation in the
bill rate; a part attributed to perceived default risk, as measured by the P2-Pi
spread; and the regression residual (augnented by the constant term). Table 8
presents suimsary statistics for these three components, including their
respective simple correlations with changes in real output, as well as
F-statistics for the significance of distributed lags on these components in
equations for real output analogous to (1) above.
What stands out in these results is that gJJ.threecomponents of the1.40
120
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
.0.5
-1.0
Figure 4
Rate Level and Quaflty Components of the Paper-Bill Spread
74 76 78 80 82 84 86 86 90
74 76 78 80 82 84 86 66 90
Residual Component of the Paper-Bill SpreadTabk 8
Analysis of Components of the Paper—Bill Spread
Correlation with:
Mean Standard óln(1P1)1n(IP)F-statistic
Deviation
Constant
Interestratelevel
Qualitydifferential
Residual
-0.12 ...
0.45 0.14 —0.11 2.65**
0.28 0.20 4(J(L)***
0 0.47 .0.I3* 2.60**
* Significantat 10% level
** Significantat 5% level
***Significantat 1% level
Notes: Results are basedonthe residual from the regression in the top panel of Table 7, line 3.
Thecorrelationsuse data from1974:1—1990:12.
The F-statistics are from reduced-fonn real output regressions analogous to those in Table 3,
for the 1974:7—1990:12 sample.-20-
paper-bill spread -- thepart attributed to variation in the bill rate, the part
attributed to perceived default risk, and the uriattributed residual component --
containstatistically significant incremental information about subsequent
fluctuations.in real output. The simple correlation of each component with the
change in real output one month ahead is significant at the .01 level. The
distributed lag on each component in equations for real output analogous to
those reported in Table 3 is significant at the .05 level or better.
Hence factors like state and municipal taxation, which plausibly account
for a major part of the averase spread over time but do not themselves plausibly
fluctuate in a systematic way over the business cycle, may still play a role in
the spread's predictive content by virtue of the way in which their effect on
the spread interacts with the level of the bill rate. Perceived default risk
(as measured by the P2-Pi spread) more plausibly fluctuates with prospects for
business activity. and it is also apparently part of the story)7 Finally, the
significance of the residual component may represent a role for either variation
in the liquidity value of bills over paper, or variation in perceived default
risk not captured by the P2-Fl spread, or both.-21-
III. Borrowers LendersjjtheShort-Term Credit Markets
The analysis in Section II suggests a role for both time-varying default
risk and a time-varying liquidity premium as explanations for the predictive
power of the paper-bill spread with respect to real output. Based as it is
entirely on the observed spread and on inferred components of the spread, that
analysis has little to say about how variations over time in either default risk
or the liquidity value of bills over paper arise, or why these variations are
related to fluctuations in real output. Given the nature of recorded
bankruptcies, it is straightforward to see why perceived default risk might
covary with the business cycle. Whytheliquidity value of bills over paper
might do so bears further investigation. In both cases, however, developing
hypotheses about financial behavior that facilitate bringing to bear data on
debt quantities as well as interest rates is likely to be helpful as a way of
distinguishing empirically among competing explanations for the predictive
properties of the spread.
Three such hypotheses are especially interesting in this context.
Chanees j1] FerceDtions .f Default E.LS. First, a widening of the
paper-bill spread in advance of business downturns may reflect anticipations, on
the part of investors, that a downturn is likely to occur and hence that default
by private borrowers with cyclically sensitive cash flows has become more
likely. To the extent that these anticipations tend on average to be correct,
fluctuations in the spread will predict fluctuations in the growth of real
output. Further, if investors' anticipations in this regard embody information
from disparate sources, or information that is otherwise difficult to quantify
or to summarize in a compact way, the paper-bill spread will have predictive
content that is significant even in the presence of other standard predictors of
output fluctuations like those included in the regressions presented in-22-
Section I.
Figure 5 shows schematically the implications, for the bank loan market
(left) and the commercial paper market (right), of an increase in the default
risk that lenders in the short-term credit markets associate with private
obligations, on the assumption that the interest rate on (default-free) Treasury
bills remains unchanged. As is consistent with the effect of an increase in
in equation (4) above, the upward-sloping curves representing lenders' portfolio
demands (alternatively, their supply of credit) in both markets shiftinward.18
As a result, the new equilibrium in each market exhibits a smaller quantity of
credit extended, and a higher interest rate (relative to default-free bills)
than before the increase in perceived default risk. Hence the implied
covariation between the observed spread to bills and the relevant credit
quantity is negative in each market.
In principle, therefore, the loan-bill spread and the paper-bill spread
might equally predict fluctuations in real output. No one has forcefully argued
this case empirically for the loan spread, however.19 One reason is probably
that bank loans have many implicit (that is, non-interest) price elements, so
that changes in observed loan interest rates are not a good measure of changes
in the cost of loans over short time horizons. Another likely reason is that
bank lending often involves long-term customer relationships in which what may
appear to be short-term departures from market-clearing pricebehavior may be
perfectly rational. On both counts, it is not surprising that the paper-bill
spread is superior as a short-run predictor of fluctuations in real output. (As
Table 1 shows, the widening of the paper-bill spread before recessions is a
matter of at most six months).
Changes ftMonetaryPolicy. A second explanation for the predictive power
of the paper-bill spread, emphasized by Bernanke (1990) and implicit in theworkF
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of Kashyap at al. (1991), points to monetary policy. Figure 6 illustrates the
basic mechanics at work here, again focusing on the respective markets for bank
loans and commercial paper. A tightening of monetary policy (smaller growth of
bank reserves) causes banks' demand for loans to shift inward. As in Figure 5,
the result is a higher loan rate and a smaller loan quantity. Here, however,
nonbank investors' demand for commercial paper has not changed. As would-be
borrowers who do not receive bank loans seek credit elsewhere, supply in the
paper market shifts outward!0 Hence the quantity of paper issued rises, as
does the commercial paper interest rate.
What is missing in the argument thus far is a reason why this increase in
the paper rate would also represent an increase in the paper-bill spread.
Tighter monetary policy presumably raises the bill rate too. If the predictive
content of the paper-bill spread arises because changes in the spread reflect
changes in monetary policy, which in turn affects output for any or all of the
standard reasons, tighter monetary policy must raise the paper rate not just
absolutely but also relative to the bill rate.
One answer to this question, following the analysis in Section II, is that
both the tax component of the spread (for given state/municipal tax rates) and
the default risk component (for given default probability and expected recovery
rate) depend directly on the level of the bill rate. To the extent that tight
monetary policy raises the bill rate, therefore, it also widens the paper-bill
spread. This line of argument is satisfactory as far as it goes. but ultimately
insufficient. As the correlations and F-statistics presented in Table 8 show,
the predictive content of the paper-bill spread is not simply a matter of the
spread's proportional covariation with the bill rate.
An alternative (albeit not mutally exclusive) explanation offered by
Zernañke and by Kashyap et al. emphasizes, in part, heterogeneity amongF
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borrowers. If the obligations of borrowers who shift from the bank loan market
to the commercial paper market when monetary policy tightens are systematically
less attractive to commercial paper investors than the obligations of borrowers
whose paper is already outstanding -- eitherbecause these new borrowers are
lass creditworthy, or because they deal in smaller volume so that their paper is
less liquid --thenthe resulting rise in default risk or loss of liquidity for
the representative issuers paper will lead the market-average commercial paper
rate to rise relative to the rate on Treasury bills (or any other instrument the
risk and liquidity of which remain unchanged).
Yet a third potential explanation (again not mutually exclusive with the
other two) reflects the behavior of investors allocating their portfolios among
different assets, as captured in equation (5). Even apart from changing
objective characteristics like default risk or liquidity, the mere fact that
investors regard commercial paper and Treasury bills as imperfect substitutes
implies that some widening of the paper-bill spread is necessary. when tight
monetary policy forces borrowers out of the banks and into the open market, to
induce investors to increase the share of their assets that consist of
commercial paper.
Changes j Borrowers QhFlows.Finally, it is also possible that the
behavior that shifts in such a way as to increase the paper-bill spread when
real economic activity turns downward is not that of lenders but of borrowers.
As Table 1 shows, the spread is especially wide not only just before recessions
but during recessions as well. Influences like tight monetary policy, by
contrast, might well be expected to change direction during the courseof a
recession, leading the spread todecrease.21 (The analogous point does not
apply to hypotheses based on time-varying default risk since, as is clearfrom
Figure 3, bankruptcy and default rates typically remain high for atleast a year-25-
after a recession ends.)
One major influence on borrowers' behavior that could plausibly account for
movements of the paper-bill spread in this context is the cyclical variation of
firms' cash flows. As revenue growth ebbs and both inventory accumulation and
operating costs continue to rise, in the final stages of a business expansion,
firms' credit requirements increase. Figure 7 shows such an increase as an
outward shift in the supply of both bank loans and commercial paper. As in the
case of the default risk hypothesis, shown in Figure 5, the underlying mechanics
are the same in both markets, at least in principle. The cash flows hypothesis,
however, implies a positive correlation between changes in the paper rate and
changes in thepaperquantity.
As in the case of the monetary policy hypothesis, here too some further
arugment is necessary to render the implied absolute increase in the paper rate
an increase also relative to the bill rate. Once again, either the
borrower-heterogeneity argument or the imperfect-substitutes argument, or both,
will suffice.s
;
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IV. Evidence nComoetingHypotheses
The results presented in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that such factors as
taxes, default risk and liquidity, which plausibly explain much of the positive
averase paper-bill spread, also play some role in accounting for the movement of
the spread over time (Table 7) as well as the spread's predictive power with
respect to fluctuations of real output (Table 8>. In terms of the more
structural analysis of Section III, an increase in perceived default risk
represents a straightforward influence on the behavior of lenders. A widening
of the paper-bill spread due to increasing importance of differential taxation,
as the general level of interest rates rises, likewise represents an influence
on lenders' behavior; but the reason why interest rates rose in the first
instance may reflect tighter monetary policy or still other influences on either
borrowers' or lenders' behavior. The same is true of arguments based on
liquidity. A shift in the composition of the "market portfolio" toward a
greater weight on commercial paper may well cause the spread between the
respective returns to paper and other assets (including bills) to widen, but the
question once again is why the outstanding volume in the paper market grew so
rapidly in the first place. Answering questions like these on the basis of
information about interest rates alone is clearly impossible.
Figures 8 and 9 present the basic data corresponding to the ouantities at
issue in the discussion of competing hypotheses in Section III. The top panel
of Figure 8 shows that the 4-quarter growth rate in the outstanding volume of
bank loans (commercial and industrial loans) typically peaks in advance of the
onset of recessions --veryslightly in advance in most episodes, though much
more so in 1957. The table's bottom panel plots analogous 4-quarter growth
rates for the total volume of non-bank-related domestic commercial paper
outstanding, as well as for the components of this total representing the0.30
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obligations of nonfinancial corporations and
finance companies,respectively.
In contrast to bank loan growth, the
growth of nonfinanc_jj paper tends tosurge
during recessions (1953, 1957, 1960, 1973,1981) more often than to peak
beforehand (1970 and 1980). Growth offinance cpjypaper,however -.and
therefore of the total too, since finance
companies typically have nearly three
times as much in outstandings as nonfinancialissuers -.ismore like that of
22 bank loans.
Figure 9 draws the same comparisons in
a different way by plotting the
respective changes in outstanding bank loans,
commercial paper issued by
nonfinancial corporations, and financecompany lending to nonfinancial
corporations (all deflated by the gross national
product deflator) during
lO-quarter intervals surrounding businesscycle peaks. Each (deflated) series
is expressed as the log deviation from
the corresponding Hansen-Prescotttrend,
normalized to equal zero in the peak
quarter. Here again, the tendency for the
growth of bank loans and finance
company paper to peak in advance of the
recession, and for the growth of nonfinancjaljssuer
commercial paper to
continue .-insome episodes, to accelerate --oninto the recession, is
23
apparent.
Given the tendency of the paper-billspread to widen in advance of
recessions, and to remain wide during recessions, these
observed quantity
movements provide support for either themonetary policy hypothesis or the cash
flows hypothesis as outlined in Section III.
Declining growth of bank loan
volume, triggered by tighter monetary policy, leadsto increases both in the
growth of commercial paper volume and in thepaper-bill spread, as either of
these two hypotheses (but not the default riskhypothesis) implies.
The simple correlations shown in the firsttwo rows of Table 9 provide
further support, especially for the cash flowshypothesis. The paper-billTable 9
CorrelationCoefficients Between the Paper—Bill Spread and Selected Valiables:
Real Nominal
Perteni change in commercial paper issued 0.32*** fl33S*s
by the nonfinancial corporate sector
Percent change In bank loans to the 0.17 O.I7
nonfinancial corporate sector
Nonfinancial sector financing deficit 0.24***
GNP. leading 2 quarters _O.47***
GNP.leading I quarter _O.51*** _0.23**s
GNP. curTent
—0.15k
GNP, lagging I quarter -O.29***
GNP, lagging 2 quarters _O.24*** —0001
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
Significant at 1% level
Notes: Observations ate quarterly; the sample is 1952:2—1990:3.
Financial flow variables are from the How of Funds database.
Real variables ale deflated by the implicit GNP dcflator.
The financing deficit is the difference betweencapital expenditure and afwr-tax cash flow of
the nonfann, nonfinancial corporate sector.-28-
spread is positively correlated with the contemporaneous realgrowth rates of
commercial paper volume and bank loan volume, but the correlationwith paper
volume growth is far greater. Under the cash flowshypothesis both correlations
would be positive, while under the monetary policyhypothesis the
spread-to-paper-growth correlation would be positive and the
spread-to-loan-growth correlation would be negative. Bycontrast, under the
default risk hypothesis both correlations would benegative.
Two further elements of this price-quantity interactiongive still further
weight to the cash flows hypothesis in preference to the
monetary policy
hypothesis. First, as the third row of Table 9 shows, thepaper-bill spread is
also strongly correlated with contemporaneous growth of the cashdeficit that
nonfinancial corporations need to finance.24 Second, the role of thefinance
companies presents a particular puzzle for the monetary policyhypothesis.
Tighter monetary policy would, in the first instance, restrict thelending of
banks but not finance companies. Would-be borrowers notaccommodated by banks
would then turn to finance companies, so that these institutions'lending (and
hence their borrowing to fund that lending) would risealong with that of
nonfinancial issuers of commercial paper. As Figures 8 and 9 show,however,
growth of finance paper fluctuates more in step with growth of bank loans than
with growth of paper issued by nonfinancial corporations.
Especially when they relate prices and quantities, simple correlations can
often be misleading. Table 10 therefore presents the results ofestimating
several variations of a regression relating the paper-bill spread to
contemporaneous and lagged growth in the total volume of non-bank-related
domestic commercial paper outstanding (including issues of both nonfinancial
firms and finance Companies) and to a direct measure of perceived default risk.
The OLS regression reported in row (1) of the table shows that the spreadR
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is related positively both to laggedpaper volume growth (expressed relative to
the total amount of paper and bills
outstanding) and to perceived default risk
as measured by the P2-Fl differential, and
negatively to the relative quantity
of Treasury bills outstanding, and that the timetrend is not only negative (as
usual) but statistically significant along with the otherthree variables. The
relationship of the paper-bill spread to paper volumegrowth and the bill
quantity provides evidence supporting the assumption thatinvestors regard
commercial paper and Treasury bills as imperfectportfolio substitutes, which is
an important element in either the monetary policyhypothesis or the cash flows
hypothesis. The relationship of the spread to the P2-Pldifferential, even in
the presence of growth in paper volume,provides evidence in favor of the
default risk hypothesis. The significance here of thenegative time trend --
indicatinga declining spread on average over time, as the commercialpaper
market has become more fully developed -- presumablyreflects the advantage of
using a relationship that makes at least some allowance forsupply effects on
the relative yields of commercial paper andTreasury bills (in contrast to, for
example, the insignificant time trends shown in Table 7).
Allowing for the simultaneity of supply and demand renders this evidencein
favor of imperfect substitutability and the role ofperceived default risk even
more persuasive. Row (2) of Table 10 reports two-stageleast-squares estimates
of the same regression, using as instruments thelog change in the real monetary
base, current and lagged once; the log change in real nonborrowedreserves
(augumented to include "extended credit"), current and laggedonce; and the
financing deficit of nonfinancial corporations (as a share of the amount of
paper and bills outstanding), current and lagged once --allvariables plausibly
related to either monetary policy or borrowers' financing needs25 TSLS
estimation based on these variables as instruments for the change in the volume-30-
of commercial paper outstanding increases the coefficientson paper volume
growth and on the pure defeult risk variable.26 The regression reported inrow
(3) shows that comparable results also follow from measuring therespective
interest rates on commercial paper and Treasury bills at three- ratherthan
27
six-months maturity.
The regression reported in row (4), again using six-monthrates, further
conf ins these findings and indicates once more the importance ofsimultaneity
in this context, If the correct dependent variable forstudying investors'
willingness to buy commercial paper versus Treasury bills is the paper-bill
spread, then adding the bill rate to both sides of the equation (so that the
dependent variable is simply the paper rate) should result in a coefficient of
unity on the bill rate as an independent variable and unchanged coefficients
elsewhere. Comparison of rows (4) and (2) shows that, the bill rate indeed has
a coefficient of approximately unity and that in other respects the new
regression corresponds quite closely to its earlier equivalent.28 Once again,
the conclusions to be drawn are that investors regard commercialpaper and
Treasury bills as imperfect substitutes in a way that matters for the paper-bill
spread, that the spread is related to fluctuations in paper volume growth that
correspond to variables plausibly reflecting changes in either monetary policy
or business financing needs, and that there is a further, independent role for
changes in perceived default risk.
The results shown in rows (5), (6) and (7) indicate thatusing the Baa-Aaa
bond rate differential in place of the P2-Pl paper rate differential(which,
following the discussion above, permits lengthening the sample) preserves the
overall flavor of the evidence. The coefficient on the quality variable is much
smaller (albeit still statistically significant), as is consistent with the bond
differential's measuring much more inaccurately the default probabilities that-31-
are relevant to commercial paper investors, but in otherrespects the results
for the longer sample are highly similar to thoseshown above.
Finally, the question remains whether the information aboutreal output
contained in the paper-bill spread cannot be justas easily (or almost as
easily) represented with more standard variables,including variables
corresponding conceptually to the several hypotheses developed in this
paper.
On the evidence, the answer is no. The resultssununarjzed in Table 11, and in
Figures 10 and 11, show that even after allowing for suchvariables as money
growth and perceived default risk and the general level of interestrates, there
is still a further element of the paper-billspread that contains predictive
content with respect to fluctuations in realoutput that is both statistically
significant and economically important.
The first column of Table 11 shows F-statistics for thereal output
equation of a 6-variable vector autoregression including the
respective log
changes in industrial production, the producer price index andMl; the change in
the bill rate; the Baa-Aaa differential; and thepaper-bill spread. The
estimation uses monthly data spanning 1960:1-1990:12, withlag length 6. Even
in the presence of these five other variables,representing so many of the
hypotheses considered in this paper, the distributed lag on thepaper-bill rate
is still significant at the .01 level. The table's secondcolumn shows
F-statistics for an analogous system with the P2-Fl differential inplace of the
Baa-Aaa differential, and sample 1974:7-1990:12. Here thepaper-bill spread is
again significant at the .01 level.
Moreover, this "residual" explanatory power of the paper-bill spread is not
just statistically significant but quantitatively important. Figures 10 and 11
show the respective Sets of impulse response functions indicating the effectson
real output (estimated responses, bounded by 95% confidence intervals) due toTable 11
F-statisticsfor FinancialVanables in Augmented Monthly Real Output Equations
60:1—90:12 74:7—90:12
0.65 LMn(Ml) 0.56
r9 0.87 1.84*
Baa—Aaa bondquality differential 3•94***
P2—Pi papcrqualitydifferential 2.25**
Paper—bill spread 5.26*** 4.08***
* Significantat 10% level ** Significantat 5% level
***Significantat 1% level
Notes: The estimated six-variable system includes the first differences of the logs of industrial
production, producer price index, and Ml; the first difference of the six-month Treasuiy biil
rate; the quality differential in levels; and the paper—bill spread in levels.
Six lags are included for each regressor.0
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the financial variables in these two systems, orthoaonalizedftth orderfts
slit variablesg listed above --tlii fl, Lth slit paper-billnread placed
ins.Inthe system estimated for the longer sanplc, the "residual"effect of
the spread on real output is immediate, large, and prolonged. Inthe system
estimated for the shorter sample, the effect is less regular but isclearly
visible nonetheless.
Even if it were true, therefore, that changes inmonetary policy or changes
in perceived default risk in principle account fully for the fluctuation ofthe
paper-bill spread and for its relationship to fluctuations in realoutput, the
spread would remain a potentially useful predictor because of its ability to
embody relevant aspects of those influences that are not captured by standard
variables like money growth and observed debt quality spreads.-33-
V. Summary21Conclusions
The empirical evidence assembled in this paper supports several specific
conclusions about the relationship between the paper-bill spread and real
economic activity in the United States. To begin, regression-based evidence for
the last three decades of U.S. experience --includingtwo sub-periods
delineated by key structural changes in financial institutions -- consistently
points to a statistically significant relationship between movements of the
paper-bill spread and subsequent fluctuations in real output, even in the
presence of other financial variables that previous researchers have often
advanced as potential business cycle predictors. This evidence includes not
only significant explanatory power of the spread in equations for real output
movements but also significant ability of the spread to account for the variance
of real output at forecast horizons relevant in a business cycle context.
Next, readily identifiable features of commercial paper and Treasury bills
-- includingthe favorable tax treatment of bills at the state and municipal
level, the default risk on paper, and the superior liquidity of bills --
distinguishthese two instruments in such a way that rational investors would
not plausibly treat them as perfect substitutes. These factors can reasonably
account for the averaze spread observed over time between the two instruments'
respective interest rates. The central focus of this paper, however, is not the
mean paper-bill spread but the spread's variation over time, and in particular
the predictive power of that variation with respect to real output. In this
context an important finding of this paper is that a decomposition of the spread
into components reflecting the interest rate level, a time-varying measure of
default risk and a residual delivers three components each of which bears a
significant relati.onship to subsequent movements in real output.
Finally, evidence based on a more structural approach exploiting the-34-
presumed imperfect portfolio substitutability of commercial paper and Treasury
bills provides support for each of three hypotheses about why movements of the
spread anticipate movements in real output. First, changing perceptions of
default risk exert a clearly recognizeable influence on the spread, an influence
that is all the more discernable after allowance for supply effects associated
with imperfect substitutability. In this respect, the spread serves as a useful
"indicator" variable, compactly summarizing information available to investors
from a variety of disparate sources; but the underlying relationships play no
directly causal role in affecting economic activity. Second, given imperfect
substitutability, a widening paper-bill spread is also a symptom of the
contraction in bank lending due to tighter monetary policy. In this respect,
the spread does in part reflect s causal influence on economic activity. Third,
there is also some evidence of s further role for independent changes in the
behavior of borrowers in the commercial paper market due to their changing cash
requirements over the course of the business cycle, but for the most part this
third channel remains a potential object of further research.
These findings are subject to numerous caveats, of course, and for the most
part there is no need to reiterate them here. The one reservation that does
perhaps deserve explicit attention in conclusion is that the abilty to sort out
these three competing hypotheses (or, for that matter, still others) with
time-series dats relies crucially on the presence of multiple independent shocks
generating movements in economic activity. For example, if changes in monetary
policy were the only factor determining whether the economy were to be in a boom
or a recession, then the effect associated above with changing perceptions of
default probabilities and the effect associated with changing business cash
flows would both merely be subsidiary reflections of monetary policy. In this
respect, investigation of the relationship between the paper-bill spread and-35-
real economic activity is little different from much of empirical
macroeconomics. Given the rich data potentially available on commercialpaper
transactions by individual borrowers and lenders, however, in this casea useful
supplement to research based on the aggregate time series would be theparallel
exploitation of micro-level data.Footnotes
*Harvard University and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,respectively.
The ideas presented in this paper are the authors'; they do not
necessarily
reflect the official stance of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The
authors are grateful to Ben Bernanke, Timothy Cook, Mark Watson, Jeff
Wooldridge and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on a preliminary
draft, and to the General Electric Foundation and the Harvard Program for
Financial Research for research support.
1. Here, as well as elsewhere throughout this paper, the interest rates shown
are discounts calculated on a 360-day basis. Data are from the Federal
Reserve Board's ILlS release.
2. The only exceptions in this 384-month series are 1975:7-9, 1976:3, 1976:5
and 1977:1-3. Prior to November 1979, the "6-month" paper rate recorded by
the Federal Reserve Board actually corresponded to paper with maturities of
120l79 days. The few anomalous negative values of the paper-bill spread
may therefore reflect a steep, upward-sloping term structure for commercial
paper in specific months during over that period. See the Federal Reserve
Bulletin, December 1979, page A-27, footnote 2.
3. Data for gross national product, the deflator, midexpansion federal
spending, and the monetary aggregates are seasonally adjusted. Data for
interest rates and the paper-hill spread are not.4. There is no readily available monthly series corresponding to mid-expansion
federal government expenditures.
5. Uizman (1990), in related work, has shown that results like thosepresented
in Table S carry over to systems simultaneously containingmany more
variables.
6. Data are from the Federal Reserve System's flow-of-funds accounts. Useful
descriptive accounts of the development and functioning of the commercial
paper market include Selden (1963), Baxter (1966), Hurley (1977, 1982), and
Stigum (1990).
7. In addition, 17 states had a franchise tax on business income, and 18
states levied an excise tax on bank income. See Commerce Clearing House,
State ]Handbook(1990).
8. Cook and Lawler (1983) provided a highly useful discussion of the role of
taxes in accounting for the paper-bill spread.
9. See Selden (1963) for an account of the inter-war experience.
10. See Moody's Investors Service (1989) for a detailed history of experience
under the rating system.
11.See, for example, Bernanke (1990).
12. See, for example, Krasker (1980).13. The classic discussion of liquidity in this context is that of Kessell
(1965). An aspect of Kessel's treatment that is especially relevant to
some of the results presented below is his argument that the premium placed
on liquidity would (like the tax effect and the default risk effect
discussed above) vary directly with the level of interest rates.
14. See Friedman (1986, 1990) for discussions of the increase in the failure
rate and the default rate as a result of increased financial fragility in
the 1980s.
15. Although augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for stationarity of the paper-bill
spread reject the nonstationarity null at the .01 level, the fact that
analogous tests for the interest rate level do not reject at the .10 level
warrants care in interpreting the standard errors on the interest rate in
these regressions, which may have non-standard asymptotic distributions.
Indeed, the observation that the spread is 1(0) while the interest rate is
1(1) is inconsistent with any hypothesis that the spread merely captures
the effect of the interest rate level (via, for example, differential
taxation) -
16.An additional symptom of the weak link between the paper-bill spread and
the Baa-Aaa bond spread is that while the paper-bill spread is I(0)the bond
quality differential appears to be 1(1) over the 1959-90 sample.
(Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are unable to reject the null hypothesis of
nonstationarity of the bond quality differential even at the .10 level,
while analogous tests for the paper-bill spread over the shorter 1974-90
sample do reject the null at the .05 level.) In other words, the bondquality differential appears to contain an integrated component that is not
shared by the paper-bill spread.
17. As the analysis above indicates, default risk may also explain why the
level of the bill rate would influence the spread. (The relationship in
(4), for example, implies that the spread is proportional to the bill rate,
with coefficient determined in part by the default probability.)
18. Here and below, the curve representing banks' demand for loans (supply of
credit) is drawn with positive but finite slope. Making the curve vertical
--thatis, assuming that banks in the aggregate have no flexiblity to
expand credit for a given quantity of reserves supported by the central
bank --wouldnot materially change the analysis.
19. In regressions analogous to those summarized in Table 3, for example, the
loan-bill spread is significant at the .05 level in the second sub-sample
but not in the first, and not for the full sample. In the context
represented by Table 5, the loan-bill spread is not significant, even at
the .10 level, in regressions also including the paper-bill spread,
(Kashyap at al. have advanced an argument for what amounts to the
loan-to-paper guantity ratio.)
20. An alternative way to express the same relationship is to note that demand
in the paper market depends on the loan rate.
21. As Figure 1 Shows, the spread does in fact tend to decrease before the
recession ends.22. Data are from the flow-of-funds accounts.
23. Kashyap et aT. (1991) examined sluillar plots, but based on the dates
identified by Romer and Romer (1989) with changes in monetary policy,
rather than on actual business cycle peaks. Kashyap et al. also did not
incorporate finance company paper in their analysis.
24. The deficit is the difference between internally generated funds (gross of
depreciation) and investment outlays. Data are from the flow-of-funds
accounts.
25. The P2-Fl spread and the lagged bill share are also included as
instruments, because they are treated as exogenous in the regression.
26. These results are robust to such changes in the instrument list as dropping
the financing deficit, or including instruments constructed from interest
rates.
27. The increase in the estimated coefficient on the quality differential in
this regression is reassuring, in that the P2-Fl differential is actually
measured for 1-month maturities.
28. 8ecause the commercial paper rate and the Treasury bill rate are each 1(1),
the limiting distribution of the coefficient on the bill rate in line (4)
is non-normal, and so its t-statistlc overstates the precision of the
parameter estimate. The coefficients on the remaining stationary
regressors will have normal limiting distributions, however.References
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